Issues in the design and implentation of an R&D tax credit for the UK by Bloom, N. et al.
 
 
ISSUES IN THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 







THE INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES








The Institute for Fiscal Studies 
7 Ridgmount Street 
London WC1E 7AE 
Tel 020 7291 4800 
























Published online at http://www.ifs.org.uk 
 
 
  1 
Issues in the design and implementation 
of an R&D tax credit for UK firms 
Nicholas Bloom, Rachel Griffith and Alexander Klemm 
Institute for Fiscal Studies 
January 2001 
1. Introduction 
R&D tax credits have become a popular policy tool for encouraging research and 
development (R&D) spending by business, with many countries offering subsidies of this 
form.
1 The divergence between private and social rates of return to R&D expenditure by 
private firms provides one of the main justifications for government subsidies to R&D.
2 
In order to achieve the optimal level of R&D investment, government policy aims to 
bring private incentives in line with the social rate of return. An R&D tax credit does this 
by reducing the cost to the firm of doing R&D. Recent empirical evidence suggests that 
R&D tax credits are an effective instrument in stimulating additional R&D. However, in 
order to be desirable, a policy needs to be cost-effective and implementable. 
This Briefing Note reviews some of the major issues in the design and implementation of 
R&D tax credits. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the existing tax treatment of R&D in the 
UK. In particular, we outline the new Research and Development Allowance – which is 
an allowance for expenditure on plant, machinery and buildings for use in scientific 
research and which is available to firms of all sizes – and the tax credit for R&D that is 
available to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We then discuss, in Section 3, 
                                                 
1 There are a large range of other policy instruments that could affect the share of GDP that is invested in 
R&D. Indirect policies such as competition policy and regulation may be important. Direct policies include 
direct funding of R&D, investment in human capital formation and extending patents protection. 
2 Firms’ decisions to undertake R&D are based on their private return to R&D. In general, the literature 
finds that the social rate of return to R&D is substantially above private rates of return. Because of this, we 
have underinvestment in R&D. IFS Briefing Note no. 12 (Griffith, 2000) provides a discussion of this 
literature. The other main justification for government subsidies to R&D is alleviating failings in the 
financial markets.  2 
some of the main design features of tax credits that have been implemented in other 
countries. The discussion mainly concerns the question of how to target new or 
incremental R&D so as to keep down the total exchequer cost. We discuss problems that 
arise in defining incremental R&D and how these can be tackled. In Section 4, we 
provide estimates of the amount of new R&D and the exchequer cost that would be likely 
to result from implementing different designs of R&D tax credit in the UK. Section 5 
concludes. Some technical details are dealt with in the Appendix. 
2.  The current tax treatment of R&D in the UK 
The UK tax system gives special treatment to R&D in SMEs and to capital expenditure 
for R&D in all firms. The Research and Development Allowance
3 (R&DA) allows plant, 
machinery and buildings to be immediately written off against profits. This treatment is 
more generous than that for similar expenditure for non-R&D activity, where there is a 4 
per cent depreciation allowance for buildings and a 25 per cent depreciation allowance 
for plant and machinery. However, since R&D is made up of around 40 per cent wages 
and salaries, 50 per cent current expenditure and 10 per cent capital expenditure, it does 
not provide a very significant subsidy to overall R&D.
4 Wages and salaries and current 
expenditure on R&D receive no special tax treatment. As with all current expenditure and 
wages and salaries, these expenditures can be immediately written off against profits. 
In the Finance Bill 2000, the government introduced an R&D tax credit aimed at SMEs.
5 
There are two parts to the scheme. The first is called R&D tax relief and allows eligible 
companies to deduct 150 per cent of qualifying R&D from their taxable profits. The 
second part is a repayable tax credit and is aimed at companies that are not in profit. The 
company can surrender its qualifying R&D losses to the exchequer in exchange for a cash 
payment worth 24 per cent of the spending on R&D. The R&D expenditure must be at 
                                                 
3 This used to be called Scientific Research Allowance and did not include development prior to April 
2000. 
4 See Office for National Statistics (2000). 
5 The legislation is found in Section 69 and Schedules 19 and 20, and applies to qualifying R&D 
expenditure incurred on or after 1 April 2000. See http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/r&d/index.htm for 
details.  3 
least £25,000 a year and the project cannot have received any other government funding, 
such as Smart or Link. The R&D can be carried out either in the UK or overseas. An 
additional restriction is that a claim for the payable R&D tax credit cannot exceed the 
PAYE / National Insurance liabilities of the company for that accounting period. 
An SME is defined as a firm that has fewer than 250 employees and either an annual 
turnover not exceeding 40 million Euros (about £25 million) or an annual balance sheet 
total not exceeding 27 million Euros (about £17 million). Any company in which the 
SME holds 25 per cent or more of the capital or voting rights must be included in this 
calculation. 
3.  Issues in designing a broader tax credit 
In the November 1998 Pre-Budget Report,
6 the government floated the idea of 
introducing a tax credit that would be available to a wider range of firms, rather than only 
to SMEs. In considering the introduction of such a tax credit, there are several design 
features that the government will have to consider. One big choice is whether to subsidise 
all R&D (a volume-based credit) or just the additional amount of R&D expenditure over 
some base (an incremental credit). In this section, we explain the difference and discuss 
problems that arise in defining incremental R&D. In particular, we consider systems that 
are in use in other countries, which include the use of a rolling-average base or a fixed 
base. 
A useful measure of the incentives a tax credit provides is the marginal effective tax 
credit (METC). The METC measures the impact of the tax credit on the price for the firm 
of increasing R&D expenditure by £1. This may differ from the headline credit rate for a 
number of reasons, which we explain below. We use a headline credit rate of 20 per cent 
for illustrative purposes. 
3.1  Volume versus incremental tax 
The aim of an R&D tax credit is to reduce the cost to firms of undertaking R&D. A 
volume-based credit gives firms a subsidy on every £1 of R&D they undertake. The  4 
METC in that case is always identical to the credit rate. With a credit of 20 per cent, 
spending an extra £1 on R&D will always increase the credit received by 20p.  
A disadvantage of volume-based credits is that they not only subsidise new R&D but also 
subsidise the R&D a firm would have done anyway. This means that part of the expense 
the government incurs does not have any impact on firms’ incentives to do more R&D (it 
leads to a large dead-weight cost). This is the reason that many governments have tried to 
target incremental R&D expenditure. This means that the tax credit only gives firms a 
subsidy on additional R&D expenditure (marginal R&D), not on the R&D they are 
already doing (non-marginal R&D). If this can be done effectively, then it increases 
firms’ incentives to do R&D in the same way as a volume-based credit, but at a much 
lower exchequer cost.  
Consider as an example a firm that did £100 of R&D last year and £120 this year. A 
volume-based credit at the assumed rate of 20 per cent would give the firm 20% × £120 = 
£24. An incremental credit would give the firm 20 per cent of the incremental or marginal 
R&D that it had done – in this case, 20% × (£120 – £100) = £4. The impact on the firm’s 
incentives to invest more will be the same under each scheme: when the firm is 
considering the cost of spending an extra £1 on R&D, it knows that it will receive £0.20 
for each additional £1. However, the exchequer cost of the volume-based tax credit is far 
greater than that of the incremental one.
7 
The main problem in designing an incremental tax credit is the difficulty of defining 
incremental R&D. To reach a definition of incremental R&D, a base level of R&D needs 
to be defined for each firm. Incremental R&D is then defined as R&D above this base 
level. Two methods that are used in other countries are (i) to define the base as a rolling 
average of some number of past years’ R&D (e.g. the past year, as in the example above, 
or the past two or three years) or (ii) to define the base with reference to a fixed year. In 
addition, the base can be defined as an absolute amount of R&D or as a ratio of R&D to 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 HM Treasury, 1998. 
7 If, instead, we think of the government setting aside a fixed amount of cash for R&D tax credits, then an 
incremental credit could offer a much higher credit rate than a volume-based credit.  5 
sales (or some other measure of firm size). Each of these systems is defined, and their 
relative merits are discussed, below. 
3.2  Rolling-average-base R&D tax credits 
A rolling-average-base design was used in the US until the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989 and is currently used in the French and Canadian tax credit 
systems. A base level of R&D is defined as the average firm-level expenditure on R&D 
over the preceding years. The number of years over which the base is defined varies from 
country to country. A firm’s incremental or marginal R&D is then defined as the 
difference between its current R&D expenditure and this base.  
This system can lead to reduced, and sometimes perversely negative, R&D incentives.
8 In 
a dynamic setting, firms will take into account the effect that increasing their current 
R&D expenditure will have on the future definition of their incremental base. The 
simplest case of an incremental base is where the R&D base level is equal to the previous 
year’s expenditure on R&D. A firm operating in such a setting knows that increasing 
R&D by £1 this year will lead to a direct payment of 20p. But this additional £1 will also 
increase the base level of R&D in the following year. Incremental R&D expenditure will 
thus be reduced by £1 in the next year (provided the firm’s R&D is not declining).  
What does this do to the value of the credit? First note that £1 tomorrow is not worth as 
much as £1 today – firms discount future earnings. We assume a discount rate of 10 per 
cent, which means that £1 tomorrow is worth 91p today. The total effect of spending an 
extra £1 on R&D is a positive revenue of 20p less a discounted loss of revenue in the 
















                                                 
8 See Eisner, Albert and Sullivan (1984) for an early discussion of these issues in the US context.  6 
Thus a statutory credit rate of 20 per cent turns into an METC of 1.8 per cent. Similarly, 
the METCs for two- and three-year rolling-average bases can be calculated as 2.6 per 
cent and 3.4 per cent (for formulae and calculations, see the Appendix). There is also a 
difference in the payment a firm receives under each of these definitions of base. 
Consider a firm that increases R&D by £10 every year. This firm receives a payment 
from the credit in each year since its current expenditure is always above its base level. 
When the base is defined as last year’s expenditure, the payment is always £2 a year (20 
per cent of the £10 increase over last year’s R&D expenditure); when the base is average 
expenditure over the past two years, the payment is £3 a year; and for a three-year 
rolling-average base, it is £4 a year.
9 For firms in this position, the payment is higher the 
longer the time period used to define the base because some non-marginal R&D is being 
subsidised.  
These METCs are calculated under the assumption that R&D expenditure does not 
decline. If it does, then negative METCs can occur. A firm whose R&D expenditure is 
more than £1 below the base level will not be paid any credit if it increases its 
expenditure by £1. The direct revenue effect of the increase would be zero. But, if the 
firm expects to increase R&D in future years, then increasing expenditure now will 
increase its future base and thus lead to a loss of revenue in the future. In our example 
above, where the base is defined as last year’s R&D level, the total effect of increasing 
expenditure by £1 will be a revenue of 0p this year and a loss of 20p (20 per cent of £1) 















                                                 
9 Taking a firm that increases it R&D expenditure by £10 every year, its current expenditure will be £15 
and £20 above its two-year and three-year rolling-average bases respectively. Applying a 20 per cent credit 
to these figures leads to these £3 and £4 credit payments.  7 
i.e. the METC will be –18.18 per cent. Because of these effects, rolling-average-base 
credits can lead to fluctuations in the value of the tax credit if R&D does not follow a 
smooth growth path. 
Table 1 illustrates the case of a firm whose R&D expenditure does not increase each year. 
R&D spending by the firm increases smoothly in most years, but there is zero R&D in 
one year (year 4) and correspondingly more R&D in the following year (year 5). This 
simple shifting of R&D expenditure from one year to the next greatly affects both the tax 
credit payments and the METC. 





Definition of base:  1-year  2-year  3-year  1-year  2-year  3-year 
         
1  55 2 3 4  0.018  0.026  0.034 
2  65 2 3 4  0.018  0.026  0.034 
3  75 2 3 4  0.200  0.117  0.034 
4  0  0 0 0  -0.182  -0.174  -0.166 
5  180 36 28 27  0.200  0.109  0.084 
6  105 0 3 4  -0.182  0.117  0.089 
7  115 2 0 4  0.018  -0.174  0.095 
8  125 2 3 0  0.018  0.026  0.034 
9  135 2 3 4  0.018  0.026  0.034 
10  145 2 3 4  0.018  0.026  0.034 
Note: We have assumed the firm also increases its level of R&D expenditure by £10 a year before year 1 
and after year 10. 
 
We see that, in year 4, when the firm cuts back its level of R&D expenditure to below its 
base, it receives no tax credit payments and has a negative METC. In reverse, in year 5, 
when the firm increases its level of R&D expenditure, it has large positive credit 
payments and a large METC rate. Hence these rolling-base credit systems can create pro-
cyclical incentives, with large positive credits in R&D booms and negative credits in 
R&D busts. In Table 1, it can also be seen that the volatility of incentives is largest for 
the one-year rolling base and least for the three-year rolling base. This is because longer 
rolling-average bases tend to reduce the effect of R&D shocks in any single year by 
spreading them out over more years.   8 
A variant of this type of system is to use the maximum R&D expenditure over the 
previous years as a definition of the base, rather than the average. This has been the 
procedure in Japan since 1967. With the maximum defined over the infinite past and for 
firms whose R&D never declines, the METC will be the same as for the one-year rolling 
base. The advantage of this definition of the base is that it will never yield a negative 
METC.
10 
3.3  Fixed-base R&D tax credits 
In order to target incremental R&D while avoiding the negative dynamic effects of using 
a rolling base, some countries, such as the US, have fixed the definition of base R&D. 
This still leaves the question of choosing the appropriate R&D base. Two potential 
schemes are discussed here – an inflation-indexed fixed base and a sales-indexed fixed 
base (as currently used in the US). These systems both have the advantage that the METC 
is never negative, and for firms whose R&D does not fall below the base, the METC is 
equal to the full credit rate. 
Inflation-indexed fixed R&D base 
Under the inflation-indexed fixed-base system, the base is defined as the level of R&D 
undertaken in a specific year. This amount is then updated each year by inflation. R&D 
over and above this base is defined as incremental R&D and is eligible for the tax credit. 
This means that for firms whose real R&D is growing, the METC will always be equal to 
the full credit rate. For firms that experience a decline in R&D expenditure, which 
happens in about a third of quoted UK firms,
11 R&D expenditure will be below their 
base. The METC rate will then be zero. The R&D credit will have no impact on such 
firms until their R&D grows above their base level again. 
One modification of this system is to update the fixed base – for example, by resetting the 
indexed base every five years. However, this would again lead to problems of negative 
dynamic incentives. As long as the R&D growth rate is similar to the rate of inflation, 
                                                 
10 This does not hold, however, if the maximum is defined over a fixed number of years instead of the all-
time maximum expenditure. In this case, negative METC can result. 
11 In the sample of UK firms we used to evaluate the R&D tax credit in Section 4, falling real R&D 
expenditure occurred in 41 per cent of observations.  9 
this modified system is quite effective; however, if they get out of line, the effectiveness 
of this system declines. An attempt to tackle this problem is to use sales instead of 
inflation to index R&D (the idea being that sales at the firm level may track R&D better 
than inflation does). 
Sales-indexed fixed R&D base 
An alternative definition of the R&D base is to index the level of R&D by the firm’s 
sales. This is the system currently in place in the US. The effect of this is that a firm can 
claim a tax credit whenever its R&D expenditure constitutes a higher percentage of sales 
than in the year the base was fixed. For firms that keep their R&D/sales ratio above that 
in their base year, the METC will always be the full credit rate. One problem with this 
approach is that the base will expand and contract in line with total sales, which may be 
more volatile than R&D expenditure.  
The efficiency of this system depends on the extent to which the R&D/sales intensity 
remains constant over time. The tax credits will be too generous for firms whose 
R&D/sales intensity rises for reasons that are independent of the credit. Some of the 
credits will then be paid for non-incremental R&D. For firms whose R&D/sales intensity 
falls (so that the base is too high), marginal R&D will not be eligible for any tax credits.  
We find that, in general, the reduction in efficiency and the dispersion of incentives over 
time are likely to be less important using a sales-indexed base than using an inflation-
indexed base, as a firm’s actual R&D level is more strongly correlated with an index 
updated by sales than by inflation (see Table 2 later). The improved targeting of marginal 
R&D using the sales-indexed R&D base leads to a higher ratio of new R&D to revenue 
cost than for the inflation-indexed fixed base.
12 
Another consideration when using fixed-base credits is the choice of the base year. In any 
given year, some firms will happen to be spending more on R&D during the year than 
their long-term average – for example, to develop a promising new innovation. Other 
firms may have spent less than they normally do, possibly in response to short-term 
                                                 
12 Although this may hold in general, for some firms, using a sales-indexed base will be problematic, e.g. if 
firms undergo major corporate restructuring.  10 
financing problems. Therefore, picking a specific year from which to use the R&D/sales 
ratio to index the future base may be inappropriate. Instead, a more suitable base could be 
created by taking an average of, for example, the three most recent year’s R&D/sales 
ratios. A three-year average trades off the advantages of taking longer averages to smooth 
out year-to-year fluctuations in firms’ R&D/sales ratios against using more recent 
information. 
4.  Illustrations of new R&D and exchequer cost  
The discussion above highlighted several issues in designing an R&D tax credit. Recent 
empirical work has suggested that R&D tax credits are an effective means of stimulating 
new R&D.
13 However, the question still remains of whether they are desirable – are they 
cost-effective? In Table 2, we present estimates of new R&D stimulated by the credit and 
the total exchequer costs of four hypothetical R&D tax credit schemes. We calculate 
these using a sample of 138 UK firms and assuming a price elasticity of –1.0 (this means 
that, for each additional subsidy of 20p, the firm will spend an extra 20p on R&D). The 
average marginal effective tax credit (METC), which represents the actual ‘strength’ of 
these tax credits, is also reported for each scheme. They are calculated as discussed in the 
previous section and in the Appendix. Each column of the table represents a different 
design of tax credit. All four use a headline rate of 20 per cent. The first column models a 
volume-based credit, the second an incremental credit using a three-year rolling-average 
base and the third an inflation-indexed fixed-base credit, while the fourth column 






                                                 
13 See, for example, Hall and Van Reenen (1999) and Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen (2000).  11 
Table 2: An illustration of new R&D and exchequer costs for four tax credits 









Average METC  20%  3.5%  14.6%  14.7% 
(Min, Max) METC  (20%, 20%)  (–16.6%, 20%)  (0, 20%)  (0, 20%) 
Correlation, R&D 
and R&D base 
n.a. 0.96 0.89 0.95 
Revenue  cost  £820.8m £126m £199.2m  £145.2m 
New R&D 
in first year 
£68m £11m £50m £43m 
Long-run 
new R&D 
£684m £113m £497m £427m 
Long-run new 
R&D / revenue 
cost 
0.83 0.90 2.48 2.94 
Notes: The figures are calculated for our sample of 138 quoted firms in 1994 only, and so do not represent 
the whole population of UK firms. The headline credit rate is 20 per cent. The own-price elasticity is –0.1 
in the short run and –1.0 in the long run. 
 
 
Guide to Table 2: 
Average METC: The average marginal effective tax credit is the weighted average of the 
METC for 138 individual firms. The weights are R&D expenditure. The 
unweighted figures look very similar. 
(Min, Max) METC: This displays the lowest and highest marginal effective tax credit 
experienced by any firm in our sample in 1994. It gives an indication of the 
distribution of the incentives provided across firms. 
Correlation, R&D and R&D base: This reports the correlation of the firm’s level of R&D 
with its R&D base, which indicates how closely the R&D base matches the firm’s 
marginal R&D – higher correlations denote a closer match. 
Revenue cost: This presents an estimate of the revenue cost to the exchequer based on our 
sample of 138 firms (so does not represent an actual estimate of total exchequer 
cost). It is used in the last row to compare new R&D with cost. 
New R&D in first year: This presents an estimate of the additional R&D generated in the 
first year by the tax credit. It uses the short-run (first-year) tax price elasticity of 
R&D of –0.1, as estimated by Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen (2000). This 
would rise over time to the longer-run estimate of new R&D. 
Long-run new R&D: This presents an estimate of the additional R&D generated by the 
tax credit. It uses the long-run tax price elasticity of R&D of –1.0, as estimated by 
Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen (2000).  
Long-run new R&D / revenue cost: This presents an estimate of the ratio of additional 
R&D to revenue costs in the long run.  
 
  12 
From Table 2, it is clear how critical the design choice of an R&D tax credit is. In 
particular:  
•  Targeting all R&D through a volume credit provides a generous credit but at a high 
revenue cost. Overall, the effectiveness of this volume credit, in terms of new R&D / 
revenue cost, is about the same as that of the rolling-average-base credit but lower 
than that of either of the fixed-index-base credits. 
•  Introducing a rolling-average base is cheap but not very effective in stimulating new 
R&D. This system creates a high degree of inequality in the METC rate faced by 
individual firms. In our sample of 138 firms, 20 per cent faced a negative METC. The 
one-, two- and three-year-base systems all provide about the same amount of new 
R&D per revenue cost. This equivalence arises because, while the three-year base has 
a higher METC, it also subsidises more non-marginal R&D because its base tracks 
the firm’s actual R&D expenditure less closely. These two effects cancel out. 
•  Creating a fixed base provides a more effective trade-off. However, over time, the 
base will become more out of line with actual firm behaviour, so that this cost 
advantage slowly diminishes. Periodic rebasing is one option, though that can 
potentially lead to problems with firms’ dynamic incentives in a similar way to the 
rolling-average base. Because sales indexation is more effective at matching the R&D 
base than inflation indexation, it provides a greater new R&D / revenue cost trade-off. 
It should also be noted that these credits will provide the bulk of their assistance to large 
firms. If an R&D tax credit is introduced to bring the private returns to R&D up to the 
social returns, then there does not appear to be any particular reason why this should be a 
problem.
14 When spillovers affect large firms and small firms equally, the distribution of 
an appropriately targeted R&D tax credit will mimic the distribution of R&D across 
firms. R&D in the UK is concentrated in a small number of firms, and thus the provision 
of the R&D tax credit will also be concentrated.  
It is also the case that R&D expenditure (as defined by tax laws and accounting 
standards) is predominantly concentrated in the manufacturing sector, which accounts for  13 
about 80 per cent of R&D but only 20 per cent of employment and value added.
15 An 
R&D tax credit will therefore provide a strong fiscal incentive to the UK manufacturing 
sector. 
5. Conclusion 
This note has not addressed the question of whether an R&D tax credit should be 
introduced. Instead, it has analysed the issues that arise in designing such a tax credit if 
one is to be introduced. It was noted that volume-based tax credits are comparatively 
expensive. Incremental tax credits can be better value for money, provided the base is 
defined so as to avoid disincentive effects. There are, however, big problems in defining 
incremental R&D in a way that does not provide firms with perverse incentives. These 
can be overcome by using fixed-base systems or by using a firm’s all-time maximum 
expenditure as a base.  
There are many other issues that would need to be addressed in the implementation of a 
tax credit that have not been discussed here. These include legal issues about 
compatibility with the rest of tax law, considerations about compliance costs, whether to 
restrict the tax credit to R&D performed in the UK, whether to make the credit repayable 
to tax-exhausted firms and whether to consider all current R&D expenditure or just some 
components, such as wages. 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 See, for example, Griffith (2000).  
15 See the OECD’s Analysis of Business Expenditure on R&D (ANBERD) (1999) and International 
Sectoral Database (ISDB) (1997) publications.  14 
Appendix 
Calculating the revenue costs and additional R&D for tax credit systems 
The sample of firms 
The estimates in Table 2 are made on a sample of UK quoted firms extracted from the 
UK Datastream on-line service. In order to use a comparable set of firms, the criteria for 
selection required that each firm: 
•  has continuously reported R&D expenditure over 1991–97 inclusive: the data for 
1991–93 enable a three-year rolling-average base to be calculated for 1994; the data 
for 1995–97 enable the effects of 1994’s R&D expenditure on the firm’s future 
rolling-average bases to be calculated.  
•  is not involved in any major merger or break-up. Such a move would lead to a jump 
change in the R&D base and invalidate our simple fixed-base system. This criterion 
excludes, for example, Glaxo Wellcome and Zeneca, as they were involved in a major 
merger in 1995 and a break-up in 1992 respectively. To include these firms in our 
study, we would need to append our fixed-base rules to deal with mergers, 
acquisitions and start-ups. 
This gives us a sample of 138 quoted firms on which we base our calculations. They are 
large firms which had average yearly sales of £1.7 billion and yearly R&D expenditures 
of £26 million. 
Methodology for calculations in Table 2 
For all systems, we assume that firms are paying enough tax to ignore the effects of tax 
exhaustion on the credit value. The R&D data are based on UK accounting data and so 
our figures may include R&D undertaken by overseas subsidiaries, which we model as 
being eligible for the tax credit, but exclude R&D undertaken by foreign multinationals in 
the UK. 
For calculating the effects of the rolling-base credit, we assume that firms can predict 
whether future R&D expenditures will be above or below their rolling-average bases. We 
also assume that firms use a 10 per cent rate to discount future revenue streams. 
For calculating the effects of a fixed-base system, we assume the base index was set in 
1991, which ensures comparability of our data sample across the columns of Table 2.  
The effective value of a rolling-base tax credit 
The marginal effective tax credit (METC) is the credit rate that a firm experiences on the 
marginal £1 of R&D. The METC will be affected by 
•  the credit rate; 
•  the firm’s discount rate; 
•  levels of past and current R&D expenditure and the expected future growth path of 
R&D expenditure (the key issue being whether R&D expenditure is above the base).  15 
For a credit given at rate c and for a discount rate of r, the METC for a k-year rolling-
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where 
 
0  if R&D is below base in year t  = t D  
1  if R&D is above base in year t 
 
So, for a credit of 20 per cent and assuming a discount rate of 10 per cent, the METCs for 
a firm whose R&D never declines are 
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=  () () ()
0.034  


































 − . 
If we instead assume that R&D is below the base in the current year, but will be above 
base in future years, the METCs become 









METC, two-year rolling-average base 
=  () ()
1736 . 0























 − ; 




1 0.20 1 0.20 1 0.20
0 0.1658
3 1 0.1 3 3 1 0.1 1 0.1
   −− − = −    +    ++
. 
If we assume that R&D is above the base now, but will be below the base in all future 
years, then the METC will be the full 20 per cent in all three cases.  16 
References 
  Bloom, N., Griffith, R. and Van Reenen, J. (2000), ‘Do R&D tax credits work? 
Evidence from an international panel of countries 1979–96’, Journal of Public 
Economics, forthcoming. 
  Eisner, R., Albert, S. and Sullivan, M. (1984), ‘The new incremental tax credit for 
R&D: incentive or disincentive?’, National Tax Journal, vol. 37, pp. 171–85.  
  Griffith, R. (2000), How Important is Business R&D for Economic Growth and 
Should the Government Subsidise It?, Briefing Note no. 12, London: Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (http://www.ifs.org.uk/innovation/randdcredit.pdf). 
  Hall, B. and Van Reenen, J. (1999), ‘How effective are fiscal incentives for R&D? A 
review of the evidence’, Research Policy, vol. 29, pp. 449–69. 
  HM Treasury (1998), Steering a Stable Course for Lasting Prosperity, Pre-Budget 
Report, November, London: HM Treasury. 
  Office for National Statistics (2000), Economic Trends: August Issue, London: 
Stationery Office. 